NOTE: This is the second part of a 2-part post. For your reference, here is the author’s first post: Part 1
There are two different approaches to solving the rural sanitation issue in Egypt are that are being introduced. The first is the traditional service clustered sanitation system. This strategy depends on planning as a basis to specify how to implement the aforementioned seven tasks and hence achieving the goals. This will be done by dividing rural Egypt into sanitation service clusters(SSC), defined from both geographical and institutional prospective as follows:
Geographical Prospective: SSC is a geographical area including a group of villages, which the planner makes sure is the optimum solution from technical, economic, environmental, and institutional points of view.
Institutional Prospective: SSC is an administrative unit of rural wastewater sector, which is a part of the organizational structure of HCWW companies. This approach ensures the provision of integrated services and hence achieving objectives of this strategy, since it realizes both a technical and an environmental dimension. By establishing a system that accommodates wastewater collected from sewered villages, to be treated in a central treatment plant. This plant would be able to receive the four possible types of polluted water that be generated from unserved villages. Since failure in solving the rural solid waste problem may lead to a shortage to achieve or not achieving the main objectives of the rural sanitation strategy; this strategy should accommodate solid wastes.
The second approach is the unclustered, decentralized sanitation approach. It was revealed that isolation of existing initiatives and lack of commitment by government agencies are significant factors preventing wide-scale replication. None of the approaches tested so far have been institutionalized. So far, the sector is in a vicious cycle as isolated initiatives remain prototypes and, as such, are not cost-effective, do not receive the attention required, are considered too expensive and/or prone to failure, and therefore are not replicated. It is clear that HCWW and its Affiliates must play a pivotal role in the development and management of small-scale sanitation.
Experience has showed that fully community-based approaches do not work in the Egyptian context. A clear strategy is needed, including other sector stakeholders (Ministries, communities, NGOs, researchers, private service providers). In particular, the solution implies a closer collaboration with the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI), a significant stakeholder of rural sanitation that manages both important surfaces of land and receiving water bodies. The strategy should enable the implementation of financial and management schemes, which guarantee full-cost recovery. Otherwise, small-scale systems risk not to be maintained properly, as the O&M of big centralized schemes is in itself currently a problem. The only way to proceed until water tariffs guarantee cost recovery is to adapt the legal and regulatory framework to allow tailor-made financing schemes, which may include contributions from concerned communities.
Wide-scale replication implies standardization. In this approach it is recommended to devise & adopt a mass-production strategy for small-scale sanitation and explore the concept of locally produced prefabricated units. Standardization of small-scale sanitation systems is needed to allow economies of scale, reduction of costs, reduction of time needed for project preparation and implementation and increase the infrastructure quality. Quality of the work done by consultants and contractors, as well as delays and cost overruns during implementation, are major issues, which standardization is best able to tackle. Many strongly advocate for the adoption of a business approach and the opening of a market for prefabricated treatment units. Such units could easily be manufactured in Egypt. There is a potentially huge market in the country and beyond. Small-scale sanitation could create a lot of job opportunities in production and implementation. Public-private partnerships (PPP) could be developed to stimulate such a process. A clear governmental strategy and leadership is required to support such a standardization process.
Finally, even if often considered as a must in Egypt, chlorination of the effluent is not recommended at all. It is almost never done properly and leads to environmental damage rather than preservation, in an environment where the quality of the receiving water body is often much worse than the non-chlorinated effluent. What is more, a shortage of chlorine makes it difficult for both water and wastewater plants to meet their supply needs (Chemonics Egypt 2009). Focus on preliminary assessment Thorough preliminary assessments, leading to realistic design parameters, are a key cost-effectiveness factor, as they allow dimensioning as close as possible to the needs. “Soft components” (e.g. preliminary interview of stakeholders and management schemes) must become an integral part of each design.
Animal manure and effluent of dairy factories need to be considered as parts of the sanitation system. In the past, faulty dimensioning of infrastructure, due to the lack of consideration of the actual situation on the ground, has cost a significant amount of money in capital and operational costs, and threatened the replication of small-scale systems. Besides, treatment facilities that are over-dimensioned risk reaching the full life expectancy (especially specific components like pumps) far before they reach their design capacity. Over-dimensioning may also lead to reduced performance. In parallel, a good forward planning is necessary, in order to anticipate future developments and design the system accordingly. It is unrealistic to plan for a 2050 horizon for such small settlements. The development of ezbas is highly heterogeneous and depends on a number of factors that are difficult to forecast, leading to large variations in growth. Modular, flexible systems need to be privileged in order to cope with the high uncertainty of future developments. Realistically, in this context, infrastructure development should be limited to a maximal 15 year planning horizon. However, space for future extension should be planned from the beginning; infrastructure can then be extended when and if needed. Take a look at this clip of the UNDP Lake Manzala Engineered Wetland Project, which investigated the suitability of using artificial wetlands as a low-cost alternative for treating sewage from cities, towns, and villages located on the fringes of the Nile Valley and Delta.
Finally, a long debate is on going between the supporters of both techniques and through different levels. Although, deeper and more extensive comparison must be made in order to pre-select the optimal approach to be implemented nationwide or at least identify the geographical location where each approach could be implemented in needed. Yet, the on-going economic crisis Egypt suffers and the on-going threat to a contest water share of the Nile river should encourage The Government of Egypt, which is increasingly aware of the rural sanitation problem, to immediately be committed to implement a National Program for Rural Sanitation in Egypt, the scale of the program should be national, and program interventions are expected to touch nearly every village and household in the Nile Valley and Delta. A well-conceived strategy based on an informed analysis of problems, participants, objectives, and alternatives is needed to ensure that the limited program resources, plus additional resources leveraged by the program, achieve the program’s objective; as the hazards of this problem do not affect only the environment and public health, but also the objectives of water resources management strategy in Egypt. Such a strategy comprises inclusively strategic tasks relevant to the solution of solid waste problem (domestic wastes and agricultural residues) in villages because solid wastes are currently considered one of the important factors causing pollution of residential areas, agricultural drains, and waterways in rural Egypt. The role of local administration and public private partnership should also be activated.
Ayman Ramadan Mohamed Ayad is an engineer and Water Resources Advisor at National Water Resources Plan (NWRP-CP), and has been involved in the future vision for Alexandria integrated water urban development. He also teaches applied hydraulics at Alexandria Universities, and serves as the Egyptian Coordinator for NAYD (Network of African Youth for Development).
Former CEO of construction giant Arab Contractors and official in deposed President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), Ibrahim Mahlab, has been appointed Egypt’s new Prime Minister by Adly Mansour – the army-appointed president who has been in office since Morsi’s removal in July. This came after interim Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi resigned last Monday February 24th.
Mahlab is Egypt’s outgoing housing minister, and given his retrograde stance as housing minister, his record in this role is explored below as an indication of the potential direction he might hope to take the country. According to the Guardian’s announcement of the news, under Mahlab’s watch as housing minister, 1,200 families were forcibly evicted from their Cairo homes, and their houses demolished (Amnesty International cited).
In January, Mahlab “in an attempt to prevent the spread of slum areas and facilitate construction procedures” issued Ministerial Decree 67/2014 to amend Egypt’s Construction Law regarding land divisions. The decree requires only 25% of land area to be set aside for roads and gardens, down from the previous share of 33%. The intentions behind his amendment are meant to ease burdens for real estate developers, and not citizens, falling in line with the status quo under previous administrations.
Further, at the annual CityScape real estate forum in early February, Mahlab announced that disputes between real estate developers and the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) have been settled, with developers being offered a new incentive bundle to facilitate investment in the market.
Mahlab’s actions as Housing Minister appear to echo Mubarak era policies in the housing sector, placing the desire to attract foreign direct investment ahead of much needed substantive reform of the systems that govern real estate development.
Mahlab’s new role as Egypt’s interim Prime Minister may prove to follow suit. It has been reported that while Mahlab would return most ministers to their former posts in the next couple of days, he is expected to stack his Cabinet largely with remnants of the old regime. On Thursday February 27th, it was reported that Mahlab appointed former finance ministry official Hany Dimian as finance minister in the new government and former technical director of the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) – architects of Cairo 2050 – Mostafa Madbouly as the new housing minister.
NOTE: for more on Madbouly’s record as housing minister: http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1530165#.UxTNYzbkt8H (Arabic).
Below is a re-post from Jon Argaman originally published on Jadaliyya. Jon Argaman is a PhD Candidate in political science at the University of Pennsylania. He researches the ways in which city building and questions of urban form emerge as sites of contestation over citizenship and identity. His dissertation research focuses on large planning and building projects in Cairo, Egypt, prior to the 2011 uprising.
Cairo is a crowded city. It is a truism that is easy to find in reportage about the city, which almost invariably begins with a description of Cairo as teeming, noisy, dusty, and polluted. Vendors and parked cars take over sidewalks for lack of space, while pedestrians walk amongst traffic. Shouts and car horns drown out everything else and traffic jams stretch on for miles. Numbers back up the impression: In 2006, just as the a long-term “visioning” exercise known as Cairo 2050 was beginning, the World Bank estimated Cairo’s population density at 37,136 per square kilometer, while CAPMAS, Egypt’s national statistics agency, more recently (2012) had the number at 45,000 per square kilometer, or about one-and-a-half times the population density of Manhattan. The 2008 JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) master plan claimed that, depending on how one defines “Greater Cairo,” it may be the most densely-populated city in the world. It would seem obvious that this level of density is a problem, and that, as Minister of Housing Ahmed al-Maghrabi said a few months before the 2011 uprising began, the city will eventually explode.However, the seemingly-commonsense notion that Cairo must be un-crowded if it is to be sustainable, is problematic in two senses: first, there are reasons to be skeptical of claims that Cairo’s degree of population density actually is unsustainable and undesirable; and second, the assumption that Cairo is “too crowded” and therefore its people must be dispersed, allows state officials to disengage from the problems and concerns of the city and the people who live in it. Instead, the discourse around density contributes to and in a sense authorizes often-fantastical plans to colonize the desert.
The Problem of Density
Historically, the question of population density in cities has been Janus-faced: on the one hand, density along with large population size is the commonsense notion of what makes a city a city. It is credited with fostering economies of scale, the exchange of goods and ideas, and cultural dynamism. On the other hand, a dense population was associated with chaos, crowding, dirt, and disease. That duality can still be found in recent discussions of the benefits and problems of urban density. In recent years, researchers have begun to uncover and explore some benefits of a densely-built and inhabited city for facing modern challenges: given basic levels of sanitation and public health infrastructure, denser cities are more productive and, notably, more environmentally-friendly. However, precisely because basic health and sanitation infrastructure are sub-par in some of the world’s densest cities, density does not correlate especially well with measures of livability. In that sense, Cairo faces very similar concerns as a number of other large cities in the so-called developing world: the question of how to accommodate a large and growing number of people with limited space and resources, and in the face of a changing climate, is a common one, especially in the discourse surrounding “megacities.” One could find similar questions about “sustainable” levels of density, asked in very similar ways, about Dhaka, Lagos, Jakarta, or Delhi. What makes Cairo notable, if not unique, is the large scale and scope of official efforts to reduce its density.
A great deal of research has been done on the impact of neoliberal policies and discourses on Greater Cairo: social and spatial polarization, the rise of gated communities and luxury consumer lifestyles, and the marginalization of a large underclass that had neither the financial nor social capital to “buy in.” It is in that context that the Egyptian state has aggressively promoted channeling Cairo’s “chaos” into new desert communities. Its most recent project, a “visioning” exercise known as Cairo 2050, contained a number of seemingly-fantastical proposals for de-densifying the city, including completely removing whole neighborhoods, replacing them with parks, and resettling their residents in planned communities in the desert. This essay, which is based on my field research on the politics of large building and planning projects in Cairo between August of 2010 and July 2012, examines the internal logic and problematic impact of those efforts.
Planning exercises for Cairo from the last few decades, up to and including the 2050 vision, are preoccupied with density. They are preoccupied with reducing the extremely high population density of Cairo and the Nile Valley, and they are preoccupied with increasing the low population density of the rest of Egypt’s geographical area. The former is seen as an untenable situation and a ticking time bomb, the latter as a waste of perfectly good land. Cairo’s desert New Towns appear for the first time in the 1970 master plan, as a reaction to what the plan characterized as a fast-growing surplus of inhabitants due to rural-urban migration, and a lack of infrastructure, particularly sewage and roads, to serve that population. By the end of that decade, plans had been drafted calling for fourteen new urban centers to be built throughout the country, nearly all in the desert. Rural-urban migration leveled off in the ensuing decades, but Cairo has continued to grow rapidly, and channeling that growth into the desert has been a core element of official plans for the city, and the country, up to the present day.
In a 2006 speech before parliament, now-former President Mubarak referred to desert colonization as Egypt’s “destiny,” a way for the nation to leave its crowded confines and achieve its full potential. He also referred to it as a necessity:
The conquest of the desert is no longer a slogan or dream but a necessity dictated by spiraling population growth. What is required is not a token exodus into the desert but a complete reconsideration of the distribution of population throughout the country.
These claims of necessity seem reasonable on the face of them. Many of the issues of concern that appear in planning documents (traffic, green space, housing capacity, pollution, health, and informality) are density-related. However, population density itself—the sheer number of people and the concentration of them—comes to be characterized as the root problem that needs solving, rather than poor transit infrastructure, poor health and education infrastructure, or housing access.
This is not to say that plans for Egypt in general and Greater Cairo in specific do not call for improvements in housing capacity, access to medical care, number of schools and schoolteachers, etc. All six of Egypt’s five-year plans, as well as Cairo’s strategic plans, dutifully include these points. Rather, they come attached to a framework of rarefaction (i.e. de-densification)—the channeling of virtually all new growth out of the city, and, in the 2050 plan, large-scale removal of citizens already living in Greater Cairo. This push for less density reflects an optimistic view of Egypt’s capacity to spread services over a wide area. There are good reasons to be skeptical of this optimism: Both the World Bank and the GOPP’s own research indicate that Cairo’s population density is actually a mitigating factor in some of the city’s most persistent problems. The road network has a low capacity relative to the volume it has to handle, and public transit options are unequal to the difficult task before them, but high density means that trips will be, in the aggregate, shorter in distance and resource cost than they otherwise might be. Planner David Sims notes that over seventy-five percent of Greater Cairo’s population lives within fifteen kilometers of the city center, and according to a 2000 study, thirty-six percent of all journeys within the Greater Cairo Region were on foot. This relatively high rate of walking, which relieves some of the burden on overtaxed road and transit infrastructure, would not be possible without high densities. Sims also notes that these densities “allow for the very high ridership of public transport systems that guarantees their frequent service and economic viability,” and that a dense, compact city tends to produce jobs and services that people need, in relatively close proximity to where they live.
If the government finds itself struggling to provide services to a population that is still compactly-distributed, it is difficult to imagine providing those same services to a widely-dispersed one, particularly for lower-income residents who would be reliant on public transit in a lower-density setting. And yet, along with the wealthy who seek space and escape from urban problems, it is precisely the very poor who are being targeted for dispersal to lower-density desert suburbs. If the public transit network is currently insufficient for a relatively compact megacity, how will it handle the vastly more complex task of linking up a sprawled one?
A City on the Verge of Explosion?
At a November 2010 presentation at the American University of Cairo—an institution that had itself decamped for the desert in search of open space—then-Minister of Housing Maghrabi was asked that very question. His answer reflected a technocratic enthusiasm: he said that a state of the art combination of highways, buses, light rail, and subway lines would provide ample transportation options, and innovative efforts to bring jobs and commerce to the new desert communities would reduce the need to travel into Cairo in the first place. He had charts and schematics feasibility studies to back his claim. A member of the audience expressed skepticism, noting that these things had been promised for the suburb of New Cairo, where the American University is now located, but few had actually materialized: “There isn’t even anyplace to park, let alone anything else.” Maghrabi responded heatedly, falling back on the claim that even if all the promised amenities had not been completed, the move to de-densify Cairo and channel growth into the desert was nonetheless necessary. “It is true we have put the cart before the horse,” he said, referring to building the suburb without equipping it with sufficient infrastructure, “but that was because we could not afford a horse. But we had to move now. We could not wait five more years, or else Cairo will become impossible.”
That Cairo is unsustainably crowded was a sentiment I encountered many times in the course of field research. It was expressed as an obvious truth, in no need of justification or explanation. Similarly, in every master planning document I have been able to find, “reducing population concentration,” to use the turn of phrase from the sixth (2007-2012) five-year plan, has been asserted as a self-evident good. In interviews, common metaphors used for the city were a dam about to burst (from English interviews), or a bomb (qombela) that is going to explode (tinfeger). The rhetoric of crisis is telling. Considering that it is possible to find statements warning of Cairo’s imminent collapse, in very similar language, from virtually every year since at least the late seventies when Cairo’s population was a fraction of what it is now, such talk implies the possibility of a myth. By myth, I mean not an outright falsehood, but a story about the world repeated again and again until it takes on the character of obvious truth. No doubt a large and growing capital will put further strain on Egypt’s water, food, financial, spatial, and infrastructural resources. But what does it mean for a city to collapse? What does it mean for a city to become impossible?
Indeed, with each of the specific ills said to be caused by Cairo’s large and densely distributed population, the iron link between density and the problem turns out to be untrue, or at least not quite true. Traffic gridlock is bad, but comparable to and in fact slightly better than what would be found in such “emerging global cities” as Bangkok or Mexico City, and in any case density seems to be a mitigating rather than an exacerbating factor (see for instance this World Bank report). It is likewise true that Cairo lacks green space, with roughly 1.65 square meters per capita instead of the WHO’s suggested minimum standard of nine square meters, or the “best practice” standard of twenty square meters commonly used in wealthier countries. However, massive rarefaction is a disproportionately invasive option, if the goal is simply to build more parks. Likewise with schools and medical care: some of Cairo’s densest areas lack enough of both, but if anything, each new school or clinic provides relatively more coverage in a dense area than a sparse one. So why have all plans since the seventies insisted on addressing these problems within a framework of density reduction?
Dirty Slums and Clean Slates
One piece of the puzzle is that some of Cairo’s most densely populated areas are informal and often illegally built neighborhoods, known in Arabic as ‘ashwa’iyyat. Or more precisely, those areas whose densities and crowding are identified as “problems,” such as Ezbet al Haggana or parts of Imbaba, tend to be ‘ashwa’iyyat(highly crowded but higher-status areas, such as Mohandiseen, are not typically characterized as unsustainable in the same way.) The high population densities they tend to have—along with disorder, ugliness, encroachment on scarce farmland, and other criticisms of these areas—are frequently described in official documents and in my interviews as the result of “a lack of planning.” Whether intentional or not, the density-reduction framework allows officials to prioritize large planning and building projects over providing the services that might make existing, but stigmatized, neighborhoods more livable. In this sense, the myth that Cairo is on the verge of detonation is a productive one. If Cairo is too crowded due to lack of planning and the rise of ‘ashwa’iyyat, then, the reasoning goes, planners must come up with a way to un-crowd it. If the root of Cairo’s urban woes is that the city is unsustainably dense, then merely providing services and infrastructure to existing areas is insufficient. In other words, the myth provides justification for the imperative to start over, to avoid dealing with the existing city, which requires a fine-grained understanding of communities and their needs, and instead turn to dreams of building new housing and cities elsewhere.
As one Cairo Governorate planner said in a personal interview, granted on condition of anonymity, “It is as if, every few decades, we declare Cairo’s problems to be impossible, unsolvable, and that the only solution is to start fresh just outside the existing built-up area.” Here, the appeal of the desert becomes evident: it is, or at least seems, empty and infinitely malleable, the perfect canvas for land-moving, water-pumping, solar technology, and other symbols of technological might that states and engineers are fond of deploying. Building in the desert at least seems like a technical problem rather than a difficult and fine-grained social problem, although getting people—particularly the poorer residents of some of the densest informal areas that are seen as contributing the most to Cairo’s crowding—to move to the desert is another story. If society cannot be controlled, the reasoning goes, perhaps nature can.
Conclusion: Perpetuating Inequities Rather Than Addressing Them
This, ultimately, is the political work that emphasis on the “crisis” and “unsustainability” of Cairo’s density does: it enables state actors to disengage with the problems and social inequalities of the city where people live, and instead imagine those people living somewhere else. Such a focus reproduces and exacerbates social inequities: it authorizes a particular kind of solution to Cairo’s problems. Rather than expanding services that can make high-density work, the state promotes sprawl. The well off (voluntarily) decamp from the city and move to new developments that are walled-off, sometimes literally, from the rest of the populace, while some of the city’s poorest are targeted for (often-involuntary, and poorly-compensated) removal to new planned communities.
The impact is even clearer in the context of official plans to transform and settle desert land outside of the Nile valley. Channeling a large fraction of Egypt’s population into the desert over a series of decades is a massive undertaking, and one that has been criticized, feasibility concerns aside, on grounds that it is an attempt to wish away Egypt’s current social reality, and to avoid addressing serious and growing inequality and polarization. Over the course of my research, I heard activists, NGO professionals, housing advocates, academics, and others express many variations on the criticism: “Why is the government pursuing fantasies in the desert when there are so many issues in the already-existing city that need to be addressed?” Density, or more precisely the way in which the discourse about Cairo’s density has been employed, is a key element of the logics of those plans and priorities. Thinking in terms of density—and how to identify and meet priorities for improving the livability of a dense city—provides both a better understanding of official policy and growth strategies, and a crucial part of thinking through alternatives.
 See for instance Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations (New York: Vintage, 1985).
 See particularly “Dreamland” in Tim Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Eric Denis, “Cairo as Neoliberal Capital: From Walled City to Gated Communities”, and Mona Abaza “Egyptianizing the American Dream: Nasr City’s Shopping Malls, Public Order, and the Privatized Military” in Singerman and Amar eds., Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East (Cairo: AUC Press, 2006).
 See David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City Out of Control (Cairo: AUC Press, 2011: Chapter 3.) For discussion of plans and decentralization up to the early 1990s, see UN-HABITAT, Metropolitan Planning and Management in the Developing World: Spatial Decentralization Policy in Bombay and Cairo(1993).
 “Tackling the Shelter Challenge of Cities: Thinking it Through Together,” GOPP Presentation at the World Bank, Cairo, April 30, 2007.
 Ibid. Also see UNDP “Greater Cairo” Project Document # 00056471.
 David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City Out of Control (Cairo: AUC Press, 2011: 228.)
EGYPT’S NEW SMART BUS
Below is a guest post from Dina Amin of the blog SELOUK : Design for Behavior Change. An earlier version is available on her site along with many other excellent posts on the role of industrial design and human behavior. We encourage you to check out SELOUK here: http://selouk.me/
My reaction when I read about the new smart bus was “finally a respectable way to commute in this city!”. I lived three and half years in Malaysia where I heavily relied on public transport, and since I am not a fan of driving in Egypt –who is?!- I’d like to be able to ditch my car any second and enjoy taking public transport.
Though I am an industrial designer, I wont be discussing any design aspects in this post, because how people reacted to having smart buses in Egypt was way more interesting to me. Here are the 5 major reactions:
1. “Great idea!”
Thank god! However, I have to note that people share more negative stuff than positive, it’s general human nature. So if you are presenting any “new” concept to this land, on the surface crust you’d find your new product or idea rejected, or even ridiculed, but at the base lies your supporters. So don’t let this hinder you, learn from all the criticism, but at the same time find your supporters and weigh all the feedback.
2. “We have social, economical problems, and they install wifi in buses!”
Since Egypt faces so many problems, people will always think priority should go to something else. I’ve faced this so many times as a designer, I’d try to solve a problem and during my research people would tell me “but we have bigger problems!”. Well yes there are bigger fish to fry, but we are 90 million, if each one of us directed his energy to solving only one problem it will get us nowhere. If someone offers a solution for a problem in transportation, and another in sanitation, and another in sports, then we’ll move much faster!
In the Smart bus case: what’s really promoted is the free wifi, though the bus offers other major benefits like RFID tickets! This means that everything would be documented; timing, bus number, bus driver, place..etc. Prices are fixed, the number of passengers in the bus would be controlled (hopefully!). There are also audio announcements of bus stops which is a great thing, which means bus routes are predefined, which means predefined bus stops and bus schedule! (again hopefully!). That’s the basics of a public transportation system that respects its citizens. We can’t discard all this and only argue whether poor people need wifi or not, which leads to the next point.
3- “The residents of Shobra are in desperate need for wifi!”
Is public transportation only for the poor? Wifi might be a luxury for a person from a low class, but it’s air for a middle and high class person. I wont ask who’s the target user of this bus, because then we’ll be empowering the layered and segregated state of Egypt. But I’d ask does this encourage car owners to take public transport? Would this help with the unbearable Cairo traffic? Would it help with offering a more sustainable environment? -I know the last one is too much, what environment! We have bigger problems to solve!
The route of the bus is from Shobra to Al-Matar. The two words Shobra and wifi don’t mix, and that’s due to our perception of what Shobra is associated with, which is partly unrealistic and very irrelevant in this case. I don’t know which Matar, the one in Sheraton or giza, but in both cases the bus will be taking major routes, meaning different people from different areas will be using the bus, a point that I should not be noting in the first place.
4- “The government….”
A private company named Alqahira public transportation launched the buses, the government had no hand in this. So would this fact change how you’d respond to having WIFI enabled buses in Cairo?
I think it would, greatly! We can’t allow ourselves to suffer from an anti-government bias, though it is historically and currently understandable. Our attitude towards the word government is a PhD research on its own, I’d personally title it: The blob we call government. We treat the whole government as one person who should solve all our problems. How can we tell the ministry of transportation that it’s better they fix the state of national security! Let alone that this was coming from the private sector. It’s completely irrelevant; it’s like telling an office furniture manufacturer to stop making chairs and go solve our unemployment problem!
5- “Give it a day, it will be stolen”
I can say without a doubt that this is a huge assumption that we make. People steal and cheat for different reasons; behavioral economist Dan Ariely did many amazing experiments in this area that you’ll find very interesting. Context plays a major role; if you respect a person and value what he pays then it’s a different case. We have to see humans in a different light, if we ever want this country to change.
AlShugairi’s experiment is a proof of that, it’s a must see! It took place in Egypt, and I am guessing it’s in one of those buses.
As a designer, I think this will continuously be the battle that we have to fight; the unconscious contradicting attitude of Egyptians towards anything new.
Egyptians, rise above the status quo.
Mohamed Adel is involved with TADAMUN: the Cairo Urban Solidarity Initiative, Takween Integrated Community Development, and Global Voices Online. This post originally appeared on URB.im/Cairo and is reposted with permission.
“The Right to Housing” is a documentary series and a part of the“Right to Housing, a Socially Just and Sustainable Built Environment” initiative. This project aims to link urban issues and challenges with the right to housing: it proposes that this right should be respected in the constitution and in laws and that adequate urban policies be put in place to reflect the needs of the people.
This initiative was launched by Shadow Ministry of Housing, a blog owned by the Egyptian blogger and urbanism researcher Yahia Shawkat, in association withMosireen, a citizen-journalism collective, and the Arab Digital Expression Foundation, ADEF.
The first short documentary, titled “Slums? No sir, these are self-built communities,”is an introduction to the series, highlighting informal communities’ experiences in building their own communities and adapting to the absent right to housing, carrying out the role the government should do.
The documentary presents Ezbet El Haggana, one of the largest informal communities in Cairo. The community is located on the Cairo – Suez road, east of the Nasr city district, is approximately 3.15 square kilometres, and has extremely variable estimations regarding its population. The Al Shehab institution for Comprehensive Development reports over one million residents, while Caritas Egypt reports half a million, and officials studiesshow less than 40 thousand.
Despite its location between two affluent residential districts, Nasr City and Heliopolis, Ezbet El Haggana shares other informal settlements’ tragedy. Consisting of four areas, only one benefits from basic services, while the other three areas have very few or no services at all.
One of the organizations presented in the series is Schaduf, a social enterprise launched in 2011 by two brothers, Sherif and Tarek Hosny. Schaduf refers to a tool used by ancient Egyptians to lift water from a low level to high one. The organization aims to move low-income families out of poverty by providing them with the opportunity to own urban rooftop farms, also known as micro gardens, that produce healthy and sustainable crops. Schaduf provides the urban farmers with technical training and with supplies.
A rooftop garden system can cost anywhere from LE 7,000 to LE 15,000 (approximately US$1,000-2,100). Loans to obtain the system help the farmers to eventually repay through a small portion of their monthly produce sales, while they also receive free training. Schaduf also offers to buy the produce from low-income families to solve sales issues.
Last May, Schaduf collaborated with Caritas Egypt to hold an urban rooftop Farming Training in Ezbet el Haggana, supported by BMZ and GIZ, thereby providing training for 20 participants regarding planting techniques and using hydroponics. By the end of this year, the goal is to train 180 participant to own their own profitable rooftop urban farms.
Schaduf’s urban rooftop farm is one of the solutions working to solve the challenges documented by the Right to Housing initiative, and it has indeed been successful in empowering communities to improve their lives in the absence of government assistance.
Photo credit: Schaduf
Ask anyone and they will tell you, this is consistently one of Egypt’s worst attributes. It cripples the economy beyond comprehension where as much as $8 billion is lost in productivity, delays and excess fuel consumption, according to the World Bank. On days where the political scene is less dramatic than Ghada Abdelrazek, Cairo’s traffic congestion trumps most topics in frequency and effect on our collective emotional state. Egypt is the only country where the evolution of traffic has led to a honking language. Yes, a honking language, where you can use your swear word of choice depending on the honking pattern.
While every aspect of the problem has been discussed and exhausted between friends, we have come to realize that feasible and theoretical solutions should take center stage. But does Cairo’s traffic really have a solution? And can we do anything about it without waiting for the government?
Finding a Solution
The good news is yes, there is a solution. In fact there are many solutions, the difficulty lies in picking the right one. We will introduce a part of one solution in this blog. But before we do, we must quickly eliminate one very wide misconception.
This will come as a surprise to many, but widening roads has almost no effect on solving the congestion problem. While congestion will be decreased on the short run, traffic naturally prefers the path of least resistance, consequently, when analyzing the city’s overall network it is revealed that drivers have the tendency to pick detours through newly widened roads. Equilibrium gets maintained and streets feel just as congested once again. Below is a photo depicting the result of continuous unsuccessful widening.
Regardless of whether this concept makes sense to you or not, the general idea is, investments and improvements for cars will only attract more and more cars to the streets. Several people have simply explained it as follows, “Widening roads to relieve congestion is like loosening your belt to relieve obesity.” So here’s where we are; we need cars to get to work but, the more cars on the road the more furious it becomes to drive to work. So we widen roads and build highways but that encourages more cars on the road and we are left with a persistent problem, until we look at public transportation.
Well managed public transportation successfully lowers the number of cars on the road and with that, congestion is decreased especially when paired with other means such as congestion pricing. The picture below offers a powerful visual representation of the same number of people using different modes of transportation.
You can view this as a gif here.
The vast number of benefits from public transportation has convinced a tremendous amount of leaders in both developed and developing countries that even if the system is not profitable, it is still worth subsidizing. Several developing countries with similar infrastructure to Cairo have already begun revitalizing their transportation with signature projects like Columbia’s BRT system.
How to implement the solution
If changing the world doesn’t happen in one day, neither will solving Cairo’s traffic problem. Working on some of Canada’s most complex construction projects has confirmed the difficulty in making Cairo move, but not the impossibility of it. Over time, I began discovering small steps that could be taken in Cairo to make those changes today. Implementing solutions to Cairo’s traffic through public transportation allows for two main options:
#1: The introduction of a new system and deciding what type of system it will be (i.e. a new subway line, a Nile ferry or a bus system) which is followed by creating the system itself.
#2: Increasing the ridership of an existing system. This would entail making this transport option more appealing either through cost, comfort or time saved. This is the option I have been advocating.
The proposal I submitted to Cairo from Below’s Our Urban Futures Ideas Competition discussed the “Living Bus Stop”, which is a sustainable design of a canopy comprised of four trunks of a Bougainvillea tree (جهنمية) with its branches rising and meeting to create shelter above riders. A seated and shaded canopy would make waiting for a bus more convenient and increase the current low ridership of buses.
Many factors combined, create a perfect public transportation system. Solving all at once may not be feasible at a given point in time, so one must strive to solve what they can with what they have. The proposal I have submitted is simple but effective. It sets the groundwork for a better transportation network that can be used by both the private and public bus systems.
A detailed proposal on the project was submitted and fortunately very well received by the judges. I was later contacted by some of the judges that wished to implement the system on The American University in Cairo (AUC’)s current bus system in a controlled environment before launching city-wide. Since then, we have discussed several aspects during Skype video conferences to implement the Living Bus Stop on AUC’s bus system. Meetings with Marc Rauch (Sustainibility Coordinator), Ashraf Salloum (University Architect) and Sherif Maged (Director of Transportation) are getting us closer to implementing the system. With 60 bus stop locations along 16 different routes in Cairo, AUC creates a perfect initial step for this sustainable future. Once this step is launched, phase two would begin.
Phase two of the project will entail installing a solar panel on each canopy to keep stations lit throughout the night for both convenience and safety. This initiative would extend the usage time of each canopy and make the battle against congestion continuous throughout the day and night.
I hope to see those colorful tree canopies around the city, at every intersection, on main bus routes to increase ridership from the levels they are at today. At the very least, they would paint the city streets with more beautiful colors and clean the polluted air we breathe every day.
The beauty of the Living Bus Stop is that even if it doesn’t increase ridership substantially, the project is simple, cheap and leads to more trees being planted around Cairo. The closer Cairo gets to a transit friendly city, the closer we will be to minimizing congestion. I will try to keep progress updates shared frequently as this project progresses so I could hear what you think! Do you think bus shelters would have an effect on increasing today’s numbers of bus riders? Would you be more likely to take a bus if the wait was more convenient? If you think you can help out with this initiative in any way, and have more ideas to share, please contact me and let’s get this city moving! e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Hossam Targam left Egypt in 2006 to complete his Civil Engineering degree at Queen’s University in Ontario, Canada. Over the last few years he has worked for consulting and contracting companies on several transportation construction projects around Ontario. He is currently a Project Coordinator with EllisDon Corporation working on the $1.4B vivaNext Project, which is part of the master plan, to transform the York Region’s transportation network.
If you would like to share your vision for Cairo, please write to us at CairoFromBelow@gmail.com so that we can feature your idea on the CfB site.
The short video, Mafto7 – Public Space in Cairo, was an introduction to the idea of how to improve public spaces in Cairo without waiting for the government, which might take years or may not even happen. The full length of Mafto7 – Public Space in Cairo introduces more examples of transformations of public spaces in Cairo and how citizens cope with the poor maintenance of these spaces.
Public spaces in Cairo are diminishing, closed with fences and are becoming more and more politicised. Therefore this film deals with the role of politics in public spaces. The experts, May al-Ibrashy (conservation architect, Megawra), Omar Nagati (architect& urban planner, CLUSTER), Ahmed Zaazaa (architect, MAAD), and Mazin Abdulkarim (architect, ZAWIA) talk about the relationship between public spaces and the revolution. This includes its impact on citizens and how public spaces were controlled before the revolution. Since the January 2011 Revolution, arts and culture have become tools to claim spaces. Many groups have implemented interventions in public spaces in Cairo such as Mahatat, Rasheed 22, etc. A group of independent artists, intellectuals and cultural institutions organized a successful festival, El-Fan Medan, two months after the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Oneof the experts spoke about El-Fan Medan and its goal and success. In addition, one of the students discusses his experience of an event in the creative arts in opera.
Despite the work being done, the citizens I have interviewed in public spaces such as Midan al-Opra, Qasr al-Nile, Midan Abdeen and Genena al-Maza explained to me how the lack of green spaces have had an impact on their lives. One of the students in Megawra says: “Most believe that the poor don’t go out. Some of the rich or middle-class people believe that the poor have double jobs, and don’t have time to spend their time in public spaces and aren’t even interested in using public spaces”. This is one of the big issues about social classes. The popularization of shopping malls, along with the deterioration of quality of public spaces have contributed to a divide among the upper and lower classes and how they use their free time. There is very little interaction or relationship between the poor and the rich, as the poor tend not to frequent the shopping malls. With improvement in the quality of public spaces, there will be more interest in utilizing them, therefore, bringing people together from all classes. Importantly, we must better understand how people spend their time in public spaces and why they are important to groups and individuals.
Most of the citizens I have interviewed have told me of only one place that they go to use their free time, and that is Azhar Park. The poor people are somehow forced to spend their time in Azhar Park and pay the fees for them and for their children due to a lack of playgrounds in the public spaces of Cairo. With this lack of suitable public space in Cairo there is a lack of public meeting places, large amounts of both noise and other environmental pollution, and most importantly, open and clean spaces for people living in Cairo to enjoy together.
In cities around the world, many activists and citizens have occupied spaces and converted undesirable public spaces into places for such activities as gardening and dancing. For example, City Repair from Portland painted street intersections in bright colours and patterns. They involved neighbours to help in converting them into neighbourhood gathering places. In Taiwan, citizens frustrated with expensive housing costs staged a “sleep-in” in the streets of the most expensive district in the city to protest the government inaction. In Great Britain, Space Hijackers, a group of self-proclaimed “anarchitects,” has performed numerous acts of “space hijacking,” from “Guerrilla Benching” (installing benches in empty public space) to the “Circle Line Party” in London’s Underground.
The end of the film details the project I, with the help of my family, have worked on in three public spaces in Cairo. In order to break apart from the politicisation in public spaces, encouraging change of the use of public spaces is needed. This politicisation of public spaces alienates people from the public spaces they might otherwise frequent near their homes. The government of Egypt and citizens of Cairo will soon lend their attention to public spaces as the way they are used evolves. According to Don Mitchell, a distinguished professor of geography: “[The idea of public space] has never been guaranteed. It has only been won through concerted struggle”. Mitchell further argues that struggle “Is the only way that the right to public space can be maintained and only way that social justice can be advanced.” According to Mitchell, it is through the actions and purposeful occupation of a space that it becomes public.
Sara Hassan is an architecture student at Technical University in Vienna. She is currently writing her master thesis, Mafto7 – Public Space in Cairo“ as well as is making a short film. She is also an activist at Amnesty International in Vienna. She hopes to reside in Cairo after her graduation this summer and to continue projects in public spaces in Egypt.